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Gender based violence is a global issue and has been a core focus of a ‘gender-based 
renaissance’. This has sparked social movements such as the ‘Women’s Marchs’ occurring 
across many global cities, social media discussions and campaigns, such as the ‘Me Too’ 
movement. This call to end gender-based discrimination and violence is particularly prevalent 
in South Africa where, in 2015, the South African rate of femicide per 100 000 women was 9.6 
whilst the World Health Organisation global average per 100 000 women was 2.41.  
 
There are many social campaigns which aim to combat gender-based violence in South Africa.  
This paper contends that the law can contribute to this struggle; particularly by addressing a 
gap in criminal law which currently does not sufficiently recognise battered woman syndrome 
as a defence to criminal conduct.  
 
This paper aims to demonstrate that the criminal law system has the opportunity to extend its 
protection of battered women. It can do so in two ways. First, the legal requirements for a claim 
of self-defence are met by an accused, experiencing battered woman syndrome, when the 
substantial impact of her abusive circumstances on her mental state are examined by taking a 
‘substance over form’ approach. Second, by recognising that a person who fits the requirements 
of battered woman syndrome may lack the requisite capacity for criminal liability; thus, 
amounting to pathological incapacity due to the pattern of abuse experienced creating a mental 
illness.  
 
Battered Woman Syndrome 
Dr Lenore Walker describes battered woman syndrome to be “measurable psychological 
changes that occur after exposure to repeated abuse”2. Trauma theories and psychological 
understandings of concepts such as learned helplessness, oppression, etc. have contributed to 
“understanding the psychological impact of physical, sexual and serious psychological abuse 
on a battered woman”3. The severity of these psychological impacts due to abuse have resulted 
                                                     
1 Africa Check ‘Femicide in South Africa: 3 numbers about the murdering of women investigated’ available at 
https://africacheck.org/reports/femicide-sa-3-numbers-murdering-women-investigated/, accessed on 19 May 
2018 researched by Gopolang Makou.  
2 LEA Walker ‘Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defence’ (2012) 6 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & 
Public Policy 321 at 326.  
3 Ibid at 327.  
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in battered woman syndrome being considered a sub-category of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) as listed under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Third Edition-Revised4. PTSD can be described as a collection of thoughts, feelings and actions 
that logically follow a frightful experience which one expects to be repeated5. Therefore, as a 
sub-category of PTSD, these attributes are also experienced under battered woman syndrome.  
 
Therefore, battered woman syndrome, is a result of severe psychological changes experienced 
through abuse that has altered the accused’s perception of circumstances in comparison to that 
of a ‘normal’ person. Consequently, conditions such as what is considered an imminent threat, 
in accordance with the legal requirements of self-defence, are perceived differently by a 
battered woman. However, in her position, with the experiences of violence and trauma, 
subjective perceptions and factors need to be considered in order to give proper effect to the 
constitutional rights of the accused6. Consequently, in the case of battered women and their 
need for protection, a substantive approach needs to the taken towards justice for an accused 
who is a product of domestic and gender-based violence; as opposed to a strictly formal one, 
largely based on objective testing that does not account for diverse communities7 with multi-
faceted social issues.  
 
Furthermore, being a subcategory of PTSD infers the presence of a mental illness, as apparent 
in the psychological changes which repeated abuse causes. Ultimately, an accused suffering 
from this syndrome can lack the mental capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions 
or lack the ability to act in accordance with this appreciation.  
 
Under both these notions of self-defence and pathological incapacity, an accused suffering 
from battered woman syndrome should have the opportunity to successfully raise a defence 
that considers and draws on their experiences of abuse, and thus have the opportunity to 
exonerate themselves of criminal liability.  
 
However, some academics, like Managay Reddi, disagree with this view and conceptualise 
battered woman syndrome differently. Reddi holds that there is no single definition of battered 
                                                     
4 Op cit note 2 at 327. 
5 Ibid. 
6 S v Ferreira and Others 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA) para 40. 
7 J Burchell Principle of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016) at 425. 
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woman syndrome. Instead, she believes that the term attempts to reflect a broad range of 
reactions experienced by a diversity of women in response to a “broad range of abusive 
conduct”8. Therefore, she is of the view that the use of battered woman syndrome in a legal 
context is controversial and concerning.  
 
Furthermore, Reddi claims that courts should continue to treat abused women, who kill their 
abusers, according to the defence strategies available. However, this paper strongly challenges 
this perception. New psychology research in conjunction with case law demonstrates a 
movement towards understanding the subjective position of battered women and how their 
actions are affected by patterns of abuse. Additionally, Jonathan Burchell’s critique of an 
exclusively objective test for reasonableness contributes to how the current forms of testing 
under the existing defence strategies are potentially unjust9. Therefore, there is a strong 
argument advocating for a defence for women suffering from battered woman syndrome and 
who subsequently commit an offence against their perpetual abuser, by closely examining the 





Definition of Self-defence 
Self-defence allows a victim of an unlawful attack, who has no other reasonable option 
available to him or her at the time of the attack, to act of their own initiative to “avert or 
minimise the danger that is being faced”10.  
 
There are two 2 requirements for self-defence: 
1. The attack must be against a legally protected interest and must be imminent or must 
have commenced but not yet completed.11 
2. The defensive attack must be a reasonable response to the attack.12 
 
                                                     
8 M Reddi ‘Battered women syndrome: some reflections on the utility of this ‘syndrome’ to South African 
women who kill their abusers’ (2005) 18 SACJ 259 at 262.  
9 Op cit note 7 at 425.  
10 Ibid note 8 at 269.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid at 271.   
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S v Ferreira13 refers to the influential work of Dr Lenore Walker, who describes three key 
standards that need to be met under a claim for self-defence: reasonable perception, imminent 
danger and equal or reasonable force to repel serious bodily damage or death14, which is aligned 
with South African law requirements for self-defence.  
 
South African law defines and conceptualises self-defence according to two distinct groups:  
1. Conditions relating to the attack and; 
2. Conditions relating to the defence.  
The requirements under each group must be met to warrant self-defence.  
 
The conditions relating to the attack include there being evidence of an attack and that the 
attack was unlawful and exerted upon a legally protected interest15. The conditions relating to 
the defence involve establishing evidence that the defence was necessary to avert the attack, 
that it was a reasonable response to the attack and that the attack was directed against the 
attacker16.  Walker’s three key standards for self-defence are an amalgamation of South African 
law’s conditions and requirements for self-defence.  
 
As will be explained below, these three identifiable, legal requirements for self-defence are 
substantively present in instances where a criminal offence can be attributed to battered woman 
syndrome. This requires engagement with the contentious issues surrounding battered woman 
syndrome formally meeting the requirements for self-defence, such as timing of the attack; and 
demonstrating that a more substantive approach should be taken.  
 
Reasonable Perception 
This standard requires identifying what a reasonable person would have perceived as danger 
and the evaluation of whether a battered woman, committing an unlawful offence, was 
reasonable in her perception of danger. The evaluation based on ‘reasonableness’ demonstrates 
the objective nature of excluding unlawfulness under self-defence. 
 
                                                     
13 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA). 
14 Op cit note 2 at 321.  
15 Op cit note 7 at 122.  
16 Ibid at 125.  
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Reddi, from her opposing position, contends that each experience of a battered woman varies 
and is therefore vastly subjective, which is inharmonious with the objective nature of excluding 
unlawfulness. Consequently, Reddi believes it would be impossible to determine what a 
reasonable battered woman would have done17; and suggests that the current reasonable 
standard in criminal law be used. Walker concurs with this perspective to an extent in that the 
experiences of battered women are so heterogeneous that there is no typical way for them to 
act 18. However, whilst this makes it difficult for the perceptions of a battered woman to be 
understood, it is only fair that “each woman’s thinking, feeling and acting be explained in the 
context of her life”19. This sentiment is shared by Jonathan Burchell who believes that the 
objective nature of testing reasonableness is inappropriate in diverse communities. He refers 
to S v Melk20 in which a judge claimed the test to be unfair as its effect is that “the 
unsophisticated and uneducated shepherd will be treated no differently from the professor”21. 
There are commonalities amongst battered women which can be testified to by experts22 and 
be used as a benchmark against which to assess the reasonableness of a battered woman. 
However, Walker and Burchell propose the inclusion of specific subjective factors, drawn from 
the life of the accused, to be considered in the assessment of reasonableness in order to be fair 
and just.  
 
The ‘honest but unreasonable’ notion presents that an accused could have honestly believed 
that she was in danger, but this perception was unreasonable in the circumstances23. This notion 
is an attempt to include subjective factors from the accused’s life, as advocated for by Walker 
and Burchell. It can be used as a mitigating factor in lowering criminal responsibility24, 
particularly in relation to the unlawfulness of her conduct because whilst her perception of 
being in danger is unreasonable, it is honest. Walker believes that the objective nature of 
determining reasonableness in this context is a problem because she believes that: 
 
“If the standard is an objective one, then it is more difficult to meet as the average 
                                                     
17 Op cit note 8 at 271.  
18 Op cit note 2 at 324.  
19 Ibid at 324.  
20 1988 (4) SA 561 (A).  
21 Op cit note 7 at 425.  




person under the law is generally expected to be a man, not a woman, and certainly 
not a woman who has experienced a history of abuse.” 25   
  
Due to the insufficiencies of the standard objective test, Walker proposes that, in examining 
what is unreasonable but honest, there needs to be an analysis from a battered woman’s point 
of view26. Consequently, she draws on the importance of deriving knowledge from the social 
sciences, like psychology, which has developed an understanding of the commonalities that 
can be expected to influence the perception of a battered woman27. This provides a more 
equitable standard against which an individual battered woman’s perceptions can be 
measured28. Walker’s proposition invites a subjective element into assessing reasonableness in 
that it allows for the perceptions and abusive experiences of a battered woman to be 
considered29. 
 
However, this is no different than our current position where courts consider the motives of 
accused suffering from domestic violence amongst other mitigating and compelling factors in 
the post-trial, sentencing stage. For example, the majority in S v Ferreira held that the 
accused’s decision to contract the killing of her abusive husband was something which had to 
be judicially evaluated30. Furthermore, it must be evaluated, not from a male or objective 
perspective31, but “by the Court placing itself as far as it can in the position of the woman 
concerned”32 with the assistance of details of the abusive relationship and the expert evidence33. 
This echoes Walker’s view of including the perceptions and abusive experiences of battered 
women. However, in such cases as Ferreira, the damage is already done in prosecuting and 
then sentencing a woman suffering from battered woman syndrome. Nonetheless, Walker’s 
proposition exposes the objective standard of assessing reasonableness under the criminal 
component of the lawfulness as inadequate when applied to a diverse community. Jonathan 
Burchell also holds this belief and claims that it can result in injustice34, which will be discussed 
when examining what can reasonably be perceived as being imminent danger.  
                                                     
25 Op cit note 2 at 323.  
26 Ibid at 324.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid. 
30 S v Ferreira and Others 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA) para 40.  
31 Ibid.   
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.    
34 Op cit note 7 at 425.  
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Therefore, this reasonable standard should involve some subjectivity, as expressed by Burchell 
and Walker. The consideration of subjective facts, based on the experiences and the severe 
mental strain experienced by a battered woman, would work towards a substance over form 
approach to criminal liability and provide protection to this vulnerable group as well as being 
more just in a diverse society such as South Africa.  
 
In S v Ferreira35, the contract killing of her abusive husband resulted in the accused pleading 
guilty to premediated murder36. On appeal, the court held that the moral blameworthiness of 
this woman depended on her motive and the subjective state of her mind to hire contract 
killers37. Hiring contract killers is a severely aggravating circumstance38 to murder and was a 
major contributing factor to her conviction. In a sentencing appeal, it is usual to consider 
substantial and compelling circumstances39 surrounding the accused. Therefore, in considering 
the “bestial treatment”40 she experienced at the hands of her husband, the court draws vital 
attention to the effects of the severe abuse on her mental state and the warping of her 
perceptions. However, this served to only benefit the accused post-trail, at sentencing, leaving 
her to be subjected to what Burchell refers to as the ‘the potential injustice’ of the objective 
reasonableness test during the trial when determining the unlawfulness of her conduct.  
Therefore, a purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the psyche of a battered woman 
becomes warped and abnormal. Thus far, attention has been drawn to how an exclusively 
objective reasonableness test does not cater for diverse realities such as that of a battered 
woman. In continuation, the adverse effects of abuse on the psyche will be examined.  
Moreover, the effectiveness of the criminal justice system is undermined when the effects of a 
damaged mental state is considered after the fact; especially when, for example, mental 
capacity is essential for imputing criminal liability.  
 
Imminent Danger       
There is no self-defence if the attack has stopped or the ‘defence’ is in anticipation of an attack. 
This is because the ‘defence’ must not be about punishment or retribution but about 
                                                     
35 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA). 
36 Ibid at 455. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid at 466 para 33.  
39 Ibid at 477 para 74.  
40 Ibid.   
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protection41. Therefore, a battered woman cannot defend herself against an attack that she 
anticipates or has already been completed as it would be interpreted as an act of vengeance or 
punishment and not self-defence; which would be considered as unlawful conduct.  
 
A major deterrent for the use of a claim of self-defence is that a battered woman, may attack 
when there is no apparent active or pending danger from her abuser. This is evident in S v 
Wiid42 where the accused shot her husband after he had stopped attacking her, and in S v 
Ferreira43 where the accused hired two men to kill her violently abusive husband whilst he 
was in a drunken stupor. S v Ferreira, is distinguishable with regards to self-defence as the 
accused hired people to kill her husband as opposed to killing him herself. Nonetheless, it 
speaks to a pattern amongst battered women to attack when they believe their abuser is the 
least dangerous to them.  Consequently, the contention around considering battered woman 
syndrome in relation to self-defence, boils down to timing and what is considered to be 
‘imminent’.   
 
This paper contends that patterns of ongoing abuse could drastically alter a battered woman’s 
perception of ‘imminent danger’.   
 
Women suffering from battered woman syndrome are hypervigilant to cues of impending 
danger. They may engage in a pre-emptive defensive attack in anticipation of the abuser 
inflicting physical damage, as per their experience44. For instance, many women still perceive 
their abusive partner to be dangerous whilst they are sleeping, knowing their partner might 
wake up and immediately begin another attack and force sexual demands on her45. Moreover, 
most batterers stalk their victims, making escape impossible46 and it is not unusual for them to 
threaten their victims with death47. Not only does this show the unlikeliness of exhausting all 
other lawful means of protection, it also speaks to the kind of conditions and the subsequent 
state of mind a battered woman is constantly living in, where the ever-present threat of attack 
                                                     
41 Op cit note 8 at 270.  
42 1990 (1)  SACR 561 (A).  
43 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA). 
44 Op cit note 2 at 324. 
45 Ibid at 325.  
46 Ibid.   
47 Ibid. 
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brings a new meaning to the idea of ‘imminent danger’48, such as experiencing flashbacks of 
previous abuse when placed in frightening situations that increases their perception of danger49. 
 
Therefore, the formal, literal meaning of ‘imminent’ cannot be given effect to in cases of abuse. 
The patterns of violence and the state of living in constant fear changes the normal perception 
of danger, resulting in hypervigilance. This is evident as per Walker’s claim that a battered 
woman’s thinking, feeling and acting must be explained in the context of her life and the way 
in which abuse has “specifically impacted on her state of mind”50 To ignore this in a legal 
assessment under self-defence would be to negate the traumatic experiences of a battered 
woman based on the general ‘objective’, formal view of ‘imminent danger’.  
 
Equal or reasonable force to repel serious bodily damage or death  
Identifying what would be reasonable in circumstances involving battered woman syndrome 
has proven to be a point of contention. However, by referring to case law, such as S v 
Ferriera51, S v Marais52 and S v Engelbrecht53 it is evident that constant, violent abuse alters 
the mental state of a victim, as will be explained later on, to the point where an objective 
approach is obsolete and insufficient. A subjective-objective approach, an amalgamation 
supported by Burchell and Walker, is more appropriate, considering that the distortion of a 
victim’s mind renders them outside the ‘normal’ paradigm of thinking and behaviour; and the 
reasonableness of an ordinarily person is no longer applicable. Nonetheless, despite her 
advocacy for the current reasonable standard, Reddi also presents a viable alternative approach 
to reasonableness. 
 
Reddi claims that the defensive act must be a reasonable response to the attack54. She qualifies 
this rule by stating that self-defence should fail when the interest protected is extremely 
disproportional to the interest impaired55, a position held in Ex Parte Die Minister van Justisie: 
In re S v Van Wyk56.  The case dealt with whether it was permissible to injure or kill another 
                                                     
48 Op cit note 2 at 325.   
49 Ibid at 327.  
50 Ibid at 324.  
51 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA).  
52 2010 (2) SACR 606 (CC). 
53 2005 (2) SACR 163 (W). 
54 Op cit note 8 at 271 with reference to Ex Parte die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 (1) SA 488 
(A).   
55 Ibid. 
56 1967 (1) SA 488 (A).  
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person by way of self-defence in defending one’s property57. In making this assessment the 
court established that there are limitations to such a defence, for instance the means of self-
defence should not be excessive in relation to the danger58. On this point the court held that 
manslaughter would not be allowed to repel a trivial assault59. From this Reddi draws the 
qualification that self-defence cannot apply where there is extreme disproportion between the 
interest protected and the interest impaired60; which is why the law calls for semblance between 
the defensive act and the harmful attack.  
 
This semblance standard is assessed according to the reasonableness test. Reddi acknowledges 
that the greatest hurdles to overcome in self-defence are its objective components61.  
 
Firstly, Reddi believes that it is inconsistent to lead evidence of battered woman syndrome. 
Such evidence compels the view that the accused is suffering from some type of mental disease 
or defect. Yet, despite this mental incapacity, her response to a threat is assessed according to 
a reasonable standard required under self-defence62. Secondly, she claims that the use of 
battered woman syndrome to explain an accused’s conduct redefines her experiences into pre-
existing legal divisions63. Not only do these divisions perpetuate the male discourse that 
dominates law, as also held by Walker, but it prejudices those that do not fit into these 
profiles64. This is problematic considering that both Walker and Reddi express that there is no 
‘single profile’ for a battered woman.  
 
Consequently, Reddi believes that expert evidence speaking to battered woman syndrome 
under the traditional self-defence doctrine only obscures the issue and presents the accused’s 
action in a less reasonable light by referring to her “psychological abnormality”65. Therefore, 
since there is not a ‘single profile for a battered woman, Reddi believes that a preferable 
standard of assessing reasonableness is to ask whether a reasonable person in the same 
extraordinary circumstances would have foreseen a claim of self-defence to be unlawful.  Such 
a proposal seems plausible and consistent with a position held by some courts. For instance, 
                                                     
57 Ex Parte die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 (1) SA 488 (A) at 488. 
58 Ibid at 489. 
59 Ibid at 498B. 
60 Op cit note 8 at 271.  
61 Ibid at 268.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid at 269.  
 12 
the court in S v Ferreira66 held that it should evaluate the situation by placing itself, as far as it 
can, in the position of the accused67. However, S v Ferreira68 was an appeal on sentencing. In 
sentencing, a post-trial process, mitigating and compelling factors, personal to the accused, are 
considered. This means placing a reasonable person is such a situation allows for subjectivity. 
But, as it stands, this does not occur within a trial. However, such a subjective inquiry is 
possible during a trail when claiming putative self-defence. This defence negates liability as 
the accused committed an unlawful offence but did so based on a genuine but mistaken belief 
that she as acting lawfully69. Consequently, the inquiry is about whether the accused had the 
intention to act unlawfully70 which is a subjective inquiry in that it focuses on the accused’s 
state of mind71; and not whether her belief was reasonable. However, whilst intention is pre-
requisite for murder, the accused can still be charged with culpable homicide in which 
negligence is the required fault element72. This is where Reddi’s preferred standard of assessing 
reasonableness is contemplated, in whether a reasonable person in the same extraordinary 
circumstances would have foreseen a claim of self-defence to be unlawful73. However, this still 
fails to consider the subjective circumstances of violent abuse experienced by a battered 
woman. Reddi and Walker observe that the reasonable person standard is still male dominant. 
Furthermore, even if a reasonable person were placed in such extreme circumstances, Walker 
holds that it would difficult for a person who has never experienced or witnessed domestic 
violence to understand how a sleeping or unarmed man could be dangerous74. Evidently, the 
subjective inquiry in determining intention under putative self-defence can be circumvented by 
instead charging the accused with culpable homicide, and only to return to an insufficient and 
uniform objective assessment standard.  
 
However, Burchell believes that the objective test has the potential for injustice in a community 
of diverse experiences75. The essence of Burchell’s critique of the objective test for negligence, 
is that it essentially punishes the “unintelligent, ignorant or inexperienced”76, who fall outside 
                                                     
66 S v Ferreira and Others 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA) para 40.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Op cit note 8 at 275.  




74 Op cit note 2 at 325.  
75 Op cit note 7 at 425. 
76 Ibid. 
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what is perceived to be ‘normal’ life experiences77. Whilst the objective test upholds equality 
before the law by assessing everyone according to an objective standard, it fails in enforcing 
substantive equality. An objective test punishes battered women and their divergent 
experiences with domestic violence as they fall outside the experiences recognised by the law, 
which Reddi and Walker expose for being male dominant. Consequently, Burchell proposes 
using a test that is a combination of subjective and objective factors. This amalgamation 
tempers the potential for injustice and substantively unequal treatment that is inherent in a 
rigorous objective standard of reasonableness78. Furthermore, an exclusively subjective test for 
reasonableness is nonsensical as it would blur the distinction between subjective intention and 
objective negligence79.  Burchell’s approach to a subjective-objective approach to what is 
reasonable for a battered woman, is more conducive in establishing substantive equality by 
being cognisant of her violent and traumatic experience with domestic violence. 
 
Burchell’s subjective-objective approach embodied in the test for criminal capacity 
The premise for a subjective-objective approach, is that Burchell believes that a rigorous 
objective test for reasonableness is potentially unjust. As a solution, Burchell looks to the 
capacity inquiry because it is subjective and can accommodate objective factors80.  
 
Burchell’s test falls under the conative portion of the test for criminal capacity (the test consists 
of assessing for cognitive and conative functioning). Since criminal capacity is a preliminary 
inquiry before negligence81, the negligence test itself remains unchanged. Instead, the 
individualisation of reasonableness occurs within an already partially subjective and objective 
inquiry into conative functionality. Therefore, if the subjective and objective standards within 
the capacity inquiry are considered, there will be no need to attempt to consider subjective 
factors into the following inquiry into reasonableness82; which is one of the issues this paper 
hopes to address. Burchell claims that this results in justice and logic coinciding83, because it 
does not force subjective elements to be considered in an inherently objective test like that for 
negligence.  
 
                                                     
77 As will be illustrated in S v Mbombela 1933 AD 269.  
78 Op cit note 7 at 427. 
79 Ibid.  
80Op cit note 7 at 430. 
81 Ibid at 426.  
82 Ibid at 430. 
83 Ibid.  
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The standard reasonableness test determines where a reasonable person would have acted 
differently. However, Burchell’s test determines whether the accused would have acted 
differently by considering the subjective factors that could affect her appreciation of the 
wrongfulness of her conduct and evaluating these conditions against “acceptable societal 
standards of behaviour”84 of another person with the same or similar subjective factors85. This 
objective element is problematic because, as previously identified, battered women are a 
heterogenous group. However, as explained by Walker, social sciences like psychology have 
identified commonalities amongst battered women which can be attested to; and be used as a 
benchmark against which to assess the reasonableness of a battered woman.  
 
Importantly, the outcome of the standard test and Burchell’s test is in essence the same, except 
the later individualises the standard of reasonableness - which Burchell believes to be 
unquestionably needed86.    
 
The application of Burchell’s proposed test can be seen in applying it after the fact to S v 
Mbombela87. In Mbombela, the accused killed a human being which he mistakenly believed to 
be a ‘tikoloshe’. The trial court initially found the accused guilty of murder88. However, the 
Appellate Division applied the standard reasonableness test, which ignored personal factors 
such as race, intelligence or superstition89, and found that although his belief was unreasonable, 
it was bona fide and lowered the charge to culpable homicide. However, Burchell finds that 
according to an individualised standard of reasonableness, the accused could not have acted 
differently90. Firstly, the court accepted that his belief in the ‘tikoloshe’ was genuine and he 
shared the widespread communal belief in the fatal powers of a ‘tikoloshe’. These subjective 
superstitious beliefs might have prevented the accused from appreciating the wrongfulness of 
his conduct91. Nonetheless, the accused would still not have the capacity to act in accordance 
with an appreciation for the wrongfulness of his conduct, as he reasonably lacked the requisite 
volitional capacity92. This is because he was informed of the ‘tikoloshe’ by young children, 
who, according to customary belief, were best able to identify evil spirits.  
                                                     
84 Op cit note 7 at 426.  
85 Ibid at 427.  
86 Ibid at 430.  
87 1933 AD 269.  
88 Op cit note 7 at 429 with reference to footnote 69.  
89 Ibid at 429.  
90 Ibid.  




There is no substantive change in assessing reasonableness just because subjective factors are 
being considered. In the standard reasonableness test, a value judgment needs to be made to 
determine what a reasonable person would have done. Similarly, in Burchell’s’ test, a value 
judgment is needed when evaluating the relevant subjective factors against acceptable 
standards of social behaviour and, consequently, if the accused could have acted differently93. 
 
Any test for reasonableness asks what the average reasonable person would do. However, 
patterns of violent abuse and degradation is not a normal experience for the average person.  
Therefore, assessing reasonableness according to the average person, without these experiences 
and perspectives, is prejudicial to an accused battered woman; as it would lead to an unfair 
conviction that would fail to consider the violations committed against her. Consequently, 
Burchell’s approach of considering subjective and objective factors under criminal capacity is 
more considerate of the subjective experiences of battered women and is more appropriate in 
working towards substantive equality before the law.  
 
 
A subjective-objective approach to self-defence is contentious. Therefore, in the alternative, 
battered woman syndrome, as an incapacity defence, is plausible considering the effects of 
abuse on the accused’s mind. Furthermore, unlike self-defence, the test for capacity, as it 
stands, is subjective; as held by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Eadie94.  However, the 
court also held that this inquiry must be approached with caution95. Cognisant of this cautious 
approach, it will be demonstrated that the mental and emotional distress caused by continuous 











                                                     
93 Op cit note 7 at 430.  
94  Ibid at 329. 
95  Ibid. 
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Pathological Incapacity:  
 
As self-defence aims to exclude unlawfulness, defences to exclude criminal capacity include 
non-pathological and pathological incapacity.  
 
Non-Pathological Incapacity  
Non-pathological incapacity refers to the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s 
conduct or to act in accordance with this appreciation due to external factors. Examples include 
intoxication, where the external factor is the consumption of an intoxicating substance; and 
provocation and emotional stress during which external factors cause the accused to experience 
extraordinary emotional provocation and stress.  
 
Non-pathological incapacity due to intoxication is not directly relevant to the mental effects of 
battered woman syndrome. However, with regards to the broader understanding of incapacity, 
it is important to note that in S v Chretien96 the court held that intoxication can exclude the 
required criminal capacity and intention of the accused97. In further efforts to understand 
incapacity, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Eadie98 held that a non-
pathological incapacity defence is about losing control, not losing one’s temper99. 
Consequently, this created the expectation, within the non-pathological defences of 
provocation and emotional stress, that a person should control their emotions.  
 
This paper aims to establish the importance of considering the subjective experiences of 
battered women. This requires using social sciences, such as psychology, to not only generate 
the semblance of a more substantively equal reasonableness standard; but to demonstrate the 
detrimental effects of systematic and continuous abuse on a battered woman’s mental health. 





                                                     
96 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A). 
97 However, in response to this judgement, an accused can still be convicted of a statutory offence under the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1988.  
98 2002 (3) SA 719 (SCA). 
99 Op cit note 7 at 329.  
 17 
Pathological Incapacity 
An accused will be pathologically incapacitated, if at the time of the offence, he or she, suffered 
from a mental illness or defect, that deprived him or her of the capacity for insight or self-
control. According to s 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act100: 
 
A person who commits an act or omission which constitutes an offence and who at this 
time suffers from a mental illness or mental defect which makes him/her incapable of: 
a. Appreciating the wrongfulness of his or her act or omission; or  
b. Acting in accordance with an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or her act or 
omission,  
shall not be criminally responsible for such an act or omission.  
 
Under this definition, mental illness must be endogenous and have occurred after the 
development of normal intellectual, social and behavioural patterns101.  
 
As will be demonstrated later on, battered women syndrome is a subcategory of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) which alters the normal psychological, social and behavioural states of 
a victim; thus, satisfying the endogenous requirement. Furthermore, the endogenous 
requirement aims to exclude the malfunctioning of the mind due to external stimuli like a 
concussion, the use of drugs or alcohol or the administration of an anaesthetic102. However, 
this does not preclude external stimuli from creating a ‘diseased mind’. This is supported by 
the Canadian Supreme Court in Rabey (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 193 (SC)103 in its expression that 
the ‘ordinary stresses and disappointments of life’ are not external factors for this purpose. 
Therefore, exceptional external stimuli can be enough to cause a mental illness and such a 
stimulus is the onset of battered woman syndrome due to experiences of ongoing abuse. This 
is supported by Navsa JA in Eadie, who held that judges, with regards to emotional distress, 
are entitled to make legitimate inferences from objective circumstances104. In the context of 
battered woman syndrome, the objective circumstances of continuous abuse can legitimately 
                                                     
100 51 of 1977. 
101 Op cit note 7 at 283. 
102 Ibid at 282. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Op cit note 7 at 329.  
 18 
give rise to inferences as to the damage done to a battered woman’s mental state105. This would 
contribute to the burden of proof on the accused to prove her mental disorder.  
 
The standards of a pathological incapacity defence demonstrate that the legal focus is on 
whether the accused could appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct and act in accordance 
with that appreciation. Failure to have this appreciation or act in accordance with it means that 
the accused has no criminal capacity and cannot be held liable. Furthermore, the onus is on the 
accused to prove, on a balance of probability, that they suffered from a mental illness at the 
time of the commission of the offence106. This means that a pathological defence is available 
to an accused suffering from battered woman syndrome if she can prove the probability that 
the ongoing abuse she experienced distorted her psyche to an extent that her mental state can 
be described as a sub-category of PTSD, a mental disorder107. To demonstrate that battered 
woman syndrome can meet the requirements of a defence of pathological incapacity, the legal 
test for insanity needs to be examined in conjunction with the views on mental illness provided 
by mental health professionals.  
 
Under South African criminal law, mental illness will result in incapacity if it “affects the 
cognitive or conative capacities so as to deprive the victim of insight into the wrongfulness” of 
their conduct or “the capacity to control” their actions according to this insight108. Walker 
demonstrates that battered woman syndrome is a sub-category of PTSD109.  She substantiates 
this claim by demonstrating that three major symptom clusters that can identify PTSD are also 
applicable to battered woman syndrome110: cognitive disturbances, high arousal symptoms and 
high avoidance symptoms. Thus, overall indicating the deterioration of the cognitive and 
conative capacities of a battered woman.  
 
Cognitive disturbances  
Cognitive disturbances centre around memories of previous abuse which serve as constant 
reminders111. When in a frightening situation, battered women often have flashbacks of 
                                                     
105 Leading evidence of continuous abuse would assist an accused in discharging the burden of proof applicable 
to pathological incapacity.  
106 FFW Van Oosten ‘Non-pathological criminal incapacity versus pathological criminal incapacity’ (1993) 6 
South African Journal of Criminal Justice 127 at 145. 
107Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition by the American Psychiatric Association. 
108 Op cit note 7 at 280. 
109 Op cit note 2 at 323. 
110 Ibid at 327.  
111 Ibid. 
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previous abusive incidents and re-experience them. This increases their perception of 
danger112, and can even alter their perception of ‘imminent’ danger. 
 
Such a case was evident in S v Ferreira113. After ongoing physical abuse, being locked in a 
room with no food, being raped by her abuser and his threat of hiring black men to rape her, 
the accused began demonstrating hyper-vigilance and behavioural changes like sleep 
disturbances114. The extent of these effects left the accused feeling tremendously fearful and 
unsafe115 every time she had a black customer buy fruit from her, as she believed it was the 
man or men hired by her abuser to rape her116.  
 
She became so desperate in her circumstance that she attempted to use ‘muti’ to change the 
demeanour of her abuser. However, when this failed, she believed that her situation was 
becoming worse when in reality there was no objective change117.  
 
High arousal symptoms 
This symptom is also defined as high anxiety where the battered woman becomes hypervigilant 
to cues of potential danger118. Little things signal an impending violent incident and cause the 
battered woman to be nervous and highly anxious119. 
 
The abuse experienced can alter a battered woman, cognitively and behaviourally, in a way 
that diverges from the norm. A broad understanding of mental illness is that there is a mental 
change after the development of normal intellectual, social and behavioural patterns120. It is 
understandable that the experiences in an individual’s life can alter these mental patterns and 
amount to a mental disorder, as evident by the diagnosis of PTSD. Similarly, the continuous 
abuse faced by a battered woman could change her mental patterns which is why “any implied 
or minor act of violence can be potentially understood…as a reasonable and imminent threat 
to her physical integrity”121 – thus diverging from the normal assessment.  
                                                     
112 Op cit note 2 at 328. 
113 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA).  
114 Ibid para 26. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid.  
117 Ibid. 
118 Op cit note 2 at 328. 
119 Ibid.  
120 Op cit note 7 at 283. 
121 Op cit note 8 at 270. 
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High avoidance symptoms 
These symptoms involve the various means of avoiding the dangerousness of the situation122. 
For instance, battered women become isolated over time due to the power and control exerted 
over them by their abuser123. This was evident in S v Ferreira124 where the abusive partner 
limited the accused’s contact with her children125, isolated her from other people and made her 
financially dependent on him126. Furthermore, this symptom is often identifiable through 
battered women supressing their feelings. This was also evident in S v Ferreira where, despite 
the ongoing violent abuse, the accused did not express her anger at her abuser127. 
 
A legal and psychological approach to mental illness 
 
When assessing mental illness, there should not be a dichotomy between the legal approach 
and the perspectives of mental health professionals. This notion has already been explored in 
S v Ferreira128 where there was testimony by psychology experts in order for the court to 
understand the circumstances of the accused, in order to ascertain mitigating and compelling 
factors to consider in her sentencing.  The judgment also referred to Walker, who advocates 
for the incorporation of psychological perspectives and testimony in relation to battered woman 
syndrome as a defence due to the effects abuse has on the mind.  
 
Furthermore, the three symptom clusters relating to battered woman syndrome demonstrate 
how psychological perspectives and testimony enhance the courts understanding of a battered 
woman’s mental state in order to evaluate if she still has cognitive and conative capacity – as 
per the legal definition of mental illness. Therefore, expert evidence relating to the distorted 
psyche or abnormal state of mind of a battered woman, is important in better understanding the 
legal concept of capacity in such circumstances. Thus, ultimately giving effect to a greater 
cause, such as the constitutional rights and protection of battered women.   
 
                                                     
122 Op cit note 2 at 328. 
123 Ibid.  
124 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA). 
125 Ibid para 19.  
126 Ibid para 23.  
127 Ibid at 464 at para 26.  
128 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA). 
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There are certain nuances which are important to understand in order to apply legal principles 
effectively. For example, in the S v Ferreira minority judgement there is an indication that 
before resorting to killing her abusive partner, the accused should have tried other available 
avenues to alleviate herself from her circumstances129. However, an expert witness in the case 
explained that the accused’s decision to kill her abuser, and hiring people to do so, was 
consistent with what research and experience has shown battered women to do130.  
 
A psychological perspective assists in a better understanding of the mind-set and circumstances 
of an accused battered woman. This is important because, as explained in S v Ferreira, the 
court must evaluate the situation by placing itself, as far as possible, in the position of the 
abused woman131, in order to attempt to understand the full extent that abuse can have on the 
accused; which they did specially in relation to finding mitigating and compelling 
circumstances with regards to sentencing. The analysis of such an approach can also be seen 
in S v Marais132.  
 
S v Marais, like S v Ferreira, concerned a woman, who after the continuous violent abuse by 
her husband, contracted his murder. The Constitutional Court in this case referred to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Ferreira, with regards to the effects of domestic 
violence133. It refers to the SCA finding that “a contract killing arranged by a battered woman, 
depending on her subjective state of mind and motive, may constitute self-defence, provided 
that the killing is objectively justifiable and is thus a complete defence to a charge of 
premediated murder” 134.  
 
Even though both cases concerned appealing a sentence as opposed to the merits of a possible 
defence, the considerations in these cases speak to the drastic effects of battered woman 
syndrome to the extent that the court considers it substantial and compelling. Consequently, it 
is proposed that a court should ask: was the killing objectively justifiable if the court placed 
itself in the subjective position of the battered woman. In such instances the purpose is to fully 
understand the debilitating position of the battered woman and the effects of ongoing abuse on 
                                                     
129 S v Ferreira and Others 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA) para 65.  
130 Ibid para 10.  
131 Ibid para 40. 
132 2010 (2) SACR 606 (CC).  
133 S v Marais 2010 (2) SACR 606 (CC) para 1. 
134 Ibid. 
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her mental state. In S v Ferreira it was evident that the accused only saw the abuse ending in 
the finality of the death of her abuser. However, in S v Marais, there was no intention to kill 
but instead the accused wished her husband to be ‘beaten into respecting her and treating her 
better’135. It is undisputed that the accused was being abused, but her life was never in danger; 
unlike in S v Ferreira, where the accused believed she had to choose between her life or her 
abuser’s. This meant that in S v Marais136, killing her husband was not a last resort, and there 
were other avenues for relief; as suggested by the minority judgement in S v Ferreira.  
 
The effectiveness of the court putting itself in the subjective position of a battered woman, lies 
in understanding, as best as possible, her desperate and distorted mental state; which can be 
achieved by referring to social sciences such as psychology.   
 
In S v Engelbrecht, the court referred to the trial court’s judgement that the accused suffered 
from diminished capacity during the premediated murder of her husband137. This judgement 
was made based on the evidence, including that given by psychiatric experts who found the 
accused to have diminished capacity. The court referred to a Canadian case where it was 
expressed that expert evidence on the psychological effects of abuse on wives and common 
law partners is relevant and necessary to understand the position of an abused individual138.  
 
This illustrates that whilst there are formal legal tests and definitions that must be applied, 
psychological perspectives enhance one’s understanding of the relationships and mental states 
involved. Thus, giving greater effect to substance rather than just form. Ultimately, this allows 
for legal tests and definitions to be applied correctly and fairly according to the nuances of the 
situation. This is in alignment with Burchell’s criticism of the objective test for reasonableness 




                                                     
135 S v Marais 2010 (2) SACR 606 (CC) para 5.  
136 S v Marais and S v Wiid 1990 (1) SACR 561 (A) deal with the controversial point of determining whether an 
attack against the abusive husband was due to a poor mental condition caused by abuse or merely ‘ordinary poor 
judgement’ due to substance abuse. Consequently, the later would amount to non-pathological incapacity which 
can cast doubt on whether there was pathological incapacity. However, this paper will not be dealing with the 
question of non-pathological incapacity and the contentious link it can have in determining whether there is 
pathological incapacity, such as what occurred in S v Wiid.  
137 S v Engelbrecht 2005 (2) SACR 163 (W) para 24. 




Through Walker, it has been demonstrated that battered woman syndrome is a diagnostic sub-
category of PTSD which is a consequence of trauma suffered through domestic violence. Women 
suffering from such a disorder should not be persecuted. The abuse they experienced was a 
violation of their constitutional rights, and their precarious and vulnerable position should not be 
perpetuated by the State subjecting them to punishment.  
 
Therefore, until legislation around mental illness and pathological incapacity is revisited, a self-
defence or a pathological incapacity claim should be available to an accused suffering from 
battered woman syndrome.   
 
Furthermore, it is essential to apply knowledge acquired from the social sciences to legal tests 
relating to mental illness because it is the only way we can give fair judicial treatment to women 
committing offences whilst suffering from battered woman syndrome. Case law and academic 
writing refer to the importance of expert testimony to explain the dynamics of an abusive 
relationship and the psychological changes and deterioration that result from it. This is why the 
courts call for an evaluative approach where the courts put themselves in the subjective position 
of the battered woman. However, this approach has been limited to sentencing proceedings, post-
trial and after the damage of prosecution is done.  
 
Finally, the law cannot apply its legal tests and standards in a vacuum. Gender disparities in 
society means that the culture of a completely blind and rigorous objective assessment of 
scenarios can be more prejudicial than fair. This requires us to place greater value on substantive 
justice and equality. The psychological evidence shows that battered woman syndrome can meet 
the standards on self-defence and pathological incapacity. Furthermore, case law shows an 
inclusion of expert testimony and the willingness to take a more subjective approach. 
Consequently, it is clear that having battered woman syndrome as a defence for unlawful conduct 
is a legal possibility which would greatly assist in mending gender disparity in society by showing 
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